

National Intelligence Council

31 August 1983

Gen. Richard L. Lawson, USAF Chief of Staff, SHAPE Stuttgart, West Germany

Dear Dick:

I enjoyed meeting you at Ebenhausen and our conversation. I mentioned an excellent manuscript by an Israeli on surprise attack. A copy is being sent to you under separate cover. It is quite long because it is a doctoral dissertation and there are parts I imagine you will want to scan or skip, but it is very much worth reading.

I also mentioned the National Intelligence Estimate then in preparation on the reliability of the East European forces. I am also sending you a copy of that Estimate. Although it doesn't go as far as I wished in dealing with this subject, at least the principals in the Intelligence Community have finally addressed this subject. It suggests that there is much to be done, both on operations aspects and intelligence ones.

Regards,

Henry S. Rowen
Chairman

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